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DECISION-MAKING AND THE SHAKY
PROPERTY FOUNDATIONS OF MUNICIPAL
BANKRUPTCY LAW
Juliet M. Moringiello *
ABSTRACT
Municipal bankruptcies are unpredictable. There are several reasons for
this statement— municipal bankruptcies are rare, involvement of the state
itself in the process varies according to the governing state law, and chapter
9, the Bankruptcy Code chapter governing the municipal bankruptcy process,
has many gaps. Congress constructed the modern chapter 9 on a foundation
of corporate bankruptcy law, a foundation whose roots—corporate finance—
are significantly different from the rules governing municipal finance. In this
Article, Professor Moringiello aims a spotlight on the property roots of
private bankruptcy law and compares them to the promissory and statutory
roots of municipal finance law and makes suggestions for a decision-making
framework for chapter 9 cases.
INTRODUCTION
It is hard to overstate the importance of the Brooklyn Journal of
Corporate, Financial & Commercial Law’s 2017 Spring Symposium
theme—Decision-Making and Legitimacy in Public Bankruptcies. The
decision-makers in private and public bankruptcies are different, as are the
bases on which they make their decisions. In business entity and individual
bankruptcies, the decision-makers have well-defined roles, established by the
Bankruptcy Code (“Code”) 1 and a voluminous body of judicial decisions.
The Code limits debtor and creditor choices in important ways and empowers
judges to enforce those limitations. In all individual bankruptcies, a trustee is
empowered to make important decisions, and in a business entity’s chapter
11, the default decision-maker is corporate management in the Code-defined
role as debtor in possession (DIP). 2 If the DIP’s choices prove harmful to
creditors the Code allows the court to replace the DIP with a trustee. 3 From
the smallest individual bankruptcy to the largest chapter 11 case; the Code
sections, debtor and creditor choices, and judicial actions have an important
concept at their core—the value of the bankruptcy estate. Bankruptcy law is
property law, and even in the most heavily negotiated chapter 11 plan, the
value of the estate provides an important baseline for decision-making.
* Professor, Widener University Commonwealth Law School. Many thanks to Ted
Janger for organizing this symposium and to the other participants in the event for their helpful
comments.
1. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101–1532 (2012).
2. Id. §§ 1101(1), 1107(a).
3. Id. § 1104.
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Municipal bankruptcy is different. The role and powers of the judge in a
municipal bankruptcy case are less clear, and often said to be limited by the
Tenth Amendment to the Constitution. 4 Chapter 9 of the Code, the chapter
that governs municipal bankruptcies, deprives bankruptcy judges of some of
the decisions that they make in private bankruptcy cases. It also lacks some
of the guidance that informs parties as they develop their plans of adjustment
(the chapter 9 analog to a plan of reorganization). Significantly, municipal
bankruptcy law is not property law. The Code explicitly prohibits a court
from interfering with a municipality’s property without its consent, 5 but
municipal bankruptcy law’s distance from property law goes far beyond this
limitation.
Municipal bankruptcy law adds a significant decision-maker: the state in
which the debtor municipality is located. The Code gives the state the right
to decide whether its municipalities can take advantage of chapter 9, 6 and
state law defines the role of state level decision-makers in the chapter 9
process. 7 Municipal bankruptcy law omits a decision-maker with a key role
in private bankruptcy: the trustee. 8 Federal law provides no independent
oversight of a debtor; the decision to replace or provide supervision over a
municipal government as part of a debt resolution procedure is left to the
states. 9
Many have analyzed the interplay between state law and decision-makers
and federal law and decision-makers in the chapter 9 context. The starting
point for the analysis is often the Tenth Amendment—because the Tenth
Amendment limits the federal powers over states, the use of bankruptcy law
over municipalities, which are created by and exist at the pleasure of their
states, must also be limited. All who have studied chapter 9 agree that it is an
imperfect tool, 10 yet they disagree on where the imperfections lie and the

4. See Michael W. McConnell & Randal C. Picker, When Cities Go Broke: A Conceptual
Introduction to Municipal Bankruptcy, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 425, 462–63 (1993) (explaining how
chapter 9’s restrictions on the court’s interference with a municipal debtor’s property is rooted in
constitutional concerns).
5. 11 U.S.C. § 904(2).
6. Id. § 109(c)(2).
7. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 141.1558(1) (2013) (empowering a state-appointed
emergency manager to act for a Michigan municipality during a chapter 9 case); see also 53 PA.
STAT. § 11701.706(a)(9) (West 2014) (in Pennsylvania, if a receiver is appointed for a distressed
municipality, the receiver both files the chapter 9 petition and acts for the municipality during the
bankruptcy case); see also R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-9-7 (Rhode Island statute giving state-appointed
receiver the power to file a chapter 9 petition on behalf of a municipality and act for the municipality
during the case).
8. See 11 U.S.C. § 902(5).
9. See e.g., 53 PA. STAT. § 11701.706(a)(9) (West 2014); Juliet M. Moringiello, Goals and
Governance in Municipal Bankrutpcy, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 403, 457–58 (2014) (explaining
different types of state supervision over municipalities in chapter 9).
10. For example, twenty-five years ago, two authors argued that municipal bankruptcy “serves
little function at all.” McConnell & Picker, supra note 4, at 470.
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extent to which federal law and institutions can, 11 do, 12 or should 13 drive the
financial restructuring of a municipality. Indeed, concerns about federal
intrusion into state affairs influenced the structure of chapter 9 and all of its
predecessors. 14 These sovereignty concerns have produced a statute that,
while borrowing large parts of chapter 11 of the Code, is riddled with gaps,
both because chapter 9 omits some provisions, notably those prescribing
priorities, and because well-understood concepts applicable to private
bankruptcies, such as “best interests of creditors,” are inapplicable to public
bankruptcies.
The structure of chapter 9 has generated a hodge-podge of judge-made
law, fashioned by bankruptcy courts whose decisions do not bind even other
bankruptcy courts. Regardless of the merits of these decisions, they fail to
provide guidance as to what might happen in the next municipal bankruptcy.
This mélange of case law might not be a cause for concern in its effect on the
ground, because every city that files for bankruptcy has a unique story behind
its decline. The patchwork nature of municipal bankruptcy law gives little
guidance, though, to the gatekeepers for chapter 9—the state executives or
legislatures who decide whether a city can file for bankruptcy at all. 15 Nor
does it give comfort to the market that municipal bankruptcy law was
originally developed to protect. The mere mention of the word “bankruptcy”
by a mayor leads to speculation about which city or county is next. 16
This Article shifts the discussion from the important balance between
state and federal decision- making power to the equally important search for
a basis for the decisions made, regardless of who makes them. In private
11. See, e.g., Andrew B. Dawson, Beyond the Great Divide: Federalism Concerns in Municipal
Insolvency, 11 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 31, 89 (2017) (arguing that the commonly understood
balance between state and federal power in chapter 9 is based on an outdated model of federalism);
see also C. Scott Pryor, Municipal Bankruptcy: When Doing Less Is Doing Best, 88 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 85, 125 (2014) (advocating for dismissal of a chapter 9 case as a key tool in the hands of the
bankruptcy court if a municipality and its creditors cannot agree on a plan that appropriately
balances bankruptcy fairness and creditor best interests); see also Stephen J. Lubben, Puerto Rico
and the Bankruptcy Clause, 88 AM. BANKR. L.J. 553, 571–72 (2014) (questioning whether § 903 of
the Code, which invalidates state laws that bind non-consenting creditors to a plan of debt
adjustment, should apply to states that have opted out of chapter 9).
12. See generally Melissa B. Jacoby, Federalism Form and Function in the Detroit Bankruptcy,
33 YALE J. ON REG. 55 (2016) (illustrating, through a study of every court hearing in the Detroit
bankruptcy, that the bankruptcy court has many more tools to shape the outcome of a chapter 9 than
commonly believed).
13. See Clayton P. Gillette & David A. Skeel, Jr., Governance Reform and the Judicial Role in
Municipal Bankruptcy, 125 YALE L.J. 1150 (2016) (arguing that because governance problems are
an inseparable element of municipal financial distress, courts should refuse to confirm a chapter 9
plan that does not address governance reforms).
14. For a good overview of how sovereignty concerns shaped federal municipal bankruptcy law,
see Dawson, supra note 11, at 39–56.
15. A municipality cannot file for bankruptcy unless it is specifically authorized by its state. 11
U.S.C. § 109(c)(2) (2012).
16. See Mary Williams Walsh, Dallas Stares Down a Texas-Size Threat of Bankruptcy, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 21, 2016, at A1.
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bankruptcy, that basis is property. Yet property does not and cannot serve as
a basis for decision-making in a public bankruptcy. Acknowledging the
irrelevance of property to municipal bankruptcy’s distributional scheme may
alleviate some of the confusion surrounding the treatment of the different
types of creditors in a chapter 9 case. Some observers of the chapter 9 process
have suggested that importing well-known private property concepts into
municipal finance 17 or expanding our understanding of property rights in the
public finance context 18 might cure its deficiencies. Indeed, some states,
notably Rhode Island, have addressed the uncertainty surrounding the
priority of general obligation bondholders by enacting statutes granting
security interests in tax receivables to such bondholders. 19 Removing
property from the analysis can guide courts and policymakers in fashioning
chapter 9 remedies that better reflect the realities of municipal finance.
In this Article, I explore state decision-making with respect to municipal
borrowing, in contrast to the property-based decision-making that forms the
foundation of bankruptcy generally. Individuals and business entities divide
their assets among creditors by granting property interests in them, and nonbankruptcy law gives creditors who did not receive consensual property
interests at the outset of the debtor-creditor relationship the right to seize a
debtor’s assets after the debtor’s default if the creditor obtains a judgment
against the debtor and complies with the applicable state’s process for
enforcing that judgment against the debtor’s property. 20 Private (nonmunicipal) bankruptcy law reflects this reality, and its rules are built around
preserving and dividing an estate composed of the debtor’s property, even
when there is no property to distribute, as is the case in most consumer
liquidations. 21
Municipal debtor-creditor law is fundamentally different. Instead of a
property basis, municipal credit has a public purpose basis. The rules
17. See Vincent S.J. Buccola, Law and Legislation in Municipal Bankruptcy, 38 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1301, 1338 (2017) (suggesting modifications to municipal finance practices by replacing
contract promises with property promises).
18. See generally Christopher K. Odinet, Of Progressive Property and Public Debt, 51 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 1101 (2016) (advocating for a progressive account of property law in order to
provide a better allocation of rights in public bankruptcy).
19. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-12-1 (creating a statutory lien on ad valorem taxes and general
fund revenues in favor of general obligation bondholders). David Skeel has questioned whether
statutes like this create genuine liens for bankruptcy purposes. See David A. Skeel, Jr., What is a
Lien? Lessons from Municipal Bankruptcy, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 675, 690–92 (2015) (suggesting
that the lien granted by the Rhode Island statute is not a property grant, but a state priority status
that should be disregarded in bankruptcy).
20. Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code provides the laws governing a private party’s
grant of an interest in personal property to secure repayment of a debt. U.C.C. §§ 9-101–709 (AM.
LAW. INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010). For an overview of the process that a creditor without a
lien on property must use to collect a debt from its debtor’s property, see ELIZABETH WARREN ET
AL., THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS: TEXT, CASES, AND PROBLEMS 335–38 (7th ed. 2014).
21. See Pamela Foohey et al., “No Money Down” Bankruptcy, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 1055, 1062
(2017) (explaining that more than 90% of consumer chapter 7 cases are “no asset” cases).
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surrounding municipal credit reflect this purpose. States restrict the amount
of money that municipalities can borrow as well as the purposes for which
they can borrow. 22 Municipal property is generally unavailable to satisfy
obligations to creditors. 23 Many states have mechanisms that give the state
enhanced control over municipal finances when a municipality falls into
financial distress. 24 Instead of pledging property to support debts,
municipalities support their obligations by promises described in terms of the
efforts used to make good on them. 25 Priorities in public finance do not start
with property; instead, statutory and constitutional provisions in some states
grant payment priorities to defined types of public debt. 26
The existing body of scholarship on chapter 9 contains excellent
observations about the efficacy of chapter 9 and suggestions for improving
the statute and its interpretation. In this Article, I build on and add to those
suggestions by changing the focus a bit. Instead of trying to reform property
concepts to accommodate municipal finance, I shift the focus away from
property. Instead, I will illustrate that property concepts as commonly
understood play a scant role in municipal finance and discuss how
recognizing that fact can guide judges and policymakers in making decisions
in chapter 9 cases.
To propose a different way of thinking about the relationship among
creditors in a municipal bankruptcy case, this Article proceeds as follows. In
Part I, I explain how bankruptcy law is based in property law and how the
Bankruptcy Code partially recognizes the lack of a property foundation for
chapter 9. In Part II, I explain that lack of a property foundation in greater
detail and outline the statutes that provide the foundation for municipal
transactions. In Part III, I explain bankruptcy policies as they relate to
priorities. In Part IV, I give suggestions for determining priorities in the
absence of property rights, and illustrate how the plan confirmation opinion
in Detroit provides an example of how these suggestions can be carried out.

22. See Nadav Shoked, Debt Limits’ End, 102 IOWA L. REV. 1239, 1251–56 (2017) (providing
an excellent summary of how states limit their municipalities’ borrowing power).
23. See infra Part II-A.
24. See THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, THE STATE ROLE IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCIAL
DISTRESS 18–22 (2013), http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/assets/2013/07/23/pew_state_role_in_l
ocal_government_financial_distress.pdf (listing laws that allow states to intervene in the financial
affairs of their municipalities and explaining several examples of such laws).
25. See infra notes 141–156 and accompanying text.
26. See David A. Skeel, Jr., States of Bankruptcy, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 677, 694–97 (2012)
(explaining the special priorities given by states to certain types of public debt, and observing that
these priority schemes are incomplete).
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I. BANKRUPTCY LAW AS PROPERTY LAW
A. PROPERTY LAW AS THE FOUNDATION OF PRIVATE
BANKRUPTCY LAW
For as long as there has been bankruptcy law, there have been spirited
debates about the goals and purposes of such a law. Whether one believes
that bankruptcy law is an orderly process for distributing state law
entitlements 27 or a system that modifies those entitlements in furtherance of
bankruptcy-specific goals; 28 entitlements, defined within a property
framework, lie at the heart of the debate. 29
The Code incorporates this property foundation into its rules governing
the actions of debtors and creditors in a bankruptcy case. The filing of a
bankruptcy petition creates an estate comprised of all the debtor’s interests in
property at the moment of filing, 30 ensuring that there is a common pool of
assets available to a debtor’s creditors. The estate is the basis of a bankruptcy
case—as Charles Tabb explains, “[t]he fundamental importance of ‘property
of the estate’ is that it establishes the ‘what’ in the core question of ‘who gets
what’ in the bankruptcy distribution.” 31
Many bankruptcy rules are designed around the estate. One category of
rules is designed to preserve the estate as a common pool of assets for
creditors. These rules prevent creditors from obtaining estate assets after the
debtor files for bankruptcy, 32 restrict the debtor’s ability to use or dispose of
estate property, 33 and allow the trustee to recover for the estate prebankruptcy transfers that were unperfected, 34 made within a short period
before the bankruptcy petition, 35 or that were deemed fraudulent. 36
Bankruptcy’s rules permit one category of creditor, the secured creditor, to

27. See, e.g., Thomas H. Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors’
Bargain, 91 YALE L. J. 857, 858 (1982) (providing a justification for the “time-honored proposition
that non-bankruptcy entitlements, such as security interests, should be recognized in bankruptcy”).
28. See, e.g., Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 788 (1987)
(asserting that “Congress intended bankruptcy law to address concerns broader than the immediate
problems of debtors and their identified creditors . . .”).
29. See Douglas G. Baird, Loss Distribution, Forum Shopping, and Bankruptcy: A Reply to
Warren, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 815, 824 (1987) (defining bankruptcy law as “a procedure in which the
actions of those with rights to the assets of a firm are stayed and the affairs of the firm are sorted
out in an orderly way”); see Warren, supra note 28, at 785 (explaining that bankruptcy disputes
center on the division of an inadequate pool of assets among creditors).
30. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (2012).
31. CHARLES JORDAN TABB, THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY 396 (4th ed. 2016).
32. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (automatic stay against all acts to obtain possession of and create, perfect,
or enforce any lien against property of the estate).
33. Id. § 363(b)(1) (requiring court approval of certain dispositions of estate property).
34. Id. § 544(a)(3).
35. Id. § 547(b)(4)(a).
36. Id. § 548.
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opt out of the common pool if that creditor created and perfected its interest
in the debtor’s assets pre-bankruptcy in accordance with state law. 37
The second important category of property rules in the Code sets the
value of property as the baseline for creditor distributions. The liquidation
value of the bankruptcy estate sets the floor for distributions in both chapter
11 38 and chapter 13. 39 Although a chapter 11 plan is often the result of
complex negotiations among the interested parties, the value of the estate sets
the baseline for negotiations in a chapter 11 case. Chapter 11 is designed to
allow the parties to negotiate over the allocation of the difference between
the liquidation value and the going concern value of the debtor enterprise.40
As a result, significant chapter 11 disputes center on valuation of the debtor
firm and its assets. 41
Some Code sections incorporate non-bankruptcy rules for division of a
debtor’s property. An example is the Code’s treatment of security interests.
Secured creditors receive the value of the assets securing their claims, and
the Code recognizes that no other claims give their holders rights in specific
property of the debtor. 42 Other Code sections allocate the estate’s property in
a bankruptcy-specific manner. To implement various bankruptcy policies, the
Code sets forth priorities in distribution, 43 and in liquidation, all non-priority
claims share equally in any remaining estate property, unless there is some
reason, such as late filing, to subordinate the claim to other non-priority
claims. 44
The above-described components of the Code recognize that in
individual and business transactions, property is the basis of payment. In
those private transactions a borrower is free to give priority in the form of a
security interest to a creditor, and creditors who did not receive such a priority
must battle other unsecured creditors for the borrower’s unencumbered
property if the borrower fails to pay. The Code’s priorities allow some of
those unsecured creditors to obtain a greater recovery than others based on

37. Id. § 541(a) brings only the debtor’s interest in property into the estate, giving the secured
party the value of its lien. See also id. § 506(a)(1) (describing the extent of a lender’s secured claim);
see also id. § 544(a)(2) (allowing a trustee in bankruptcy to set aside a security interest that was not
properly perfected under the applicable state law).
38. Id. § 1129(a)(7)(ii) (requiring that each holder of an impaired claim that does not accept the
plan of reorganization receive property worth at least as much as that creditor would have received
in a chapter 7 liquidation).
39. Id. § 1324(a)(4) (requiring that all claim holders receive at least what they would have
received in a liquidation).
40. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-595 (1977).
41. See generally Bruce A. Markell, Fair Equivalents and Market Prices: Bankruptcy
Cramdown Interest Rates, 33 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 91 (2016) (discussing valuation in the
cramdown context).
42. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a).
43. Id. § 507.
44. Id. § 726(a), (b).
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policy decisions about the worthiness of those creditors, as I discuss in Part
III-C below.
B. CHAPTER 9 PARTIALLY RECOGNIZES ITS LACK OF A PROPERTY
FOUNDATION
As illustrated above, individual and business entity bankruptcy is
designed to allocate a common pool of assets among the debtor’s creditors.
Municipal finance is not asset-based, a fact that contributed to the legislative
discomfort about the desirability of including debt adjustment in a federal
bankruptcy law. Lawmakers, judges, and observers have questioned the
compatibility of municipal debt adjustment and federal bankruptcy law since
before the enactment of the predecessor to chapter 9. In the hearings on the
first attempt 45 at a municipal bankruptcy statute in 1933, several members of
Congress expressed concern about the lack of a property foundation for
municipal financial relief. Legislators were concerned that a municipality
seeking bankruptcy would give up nothing, therefore receiving debt relief
without a corresponding obligation to part with any property. 46
These questions did not abate after Congress passed the first municipal
bankruptcy law, with some observers wondering whether the purview of the
Bankruptcy Clause could include a law that did not contemplate the surrender
of a debtor’s assets in satisfaction of creditor claims. 47 Although the scope of

45. The United States Supreme Court struck down Congress’ first attempt at a municipal
bankruptcy law as an impermissible encroachment on state sovereignty. Ashton v. Cameron Cty.
Water Improvement Dist., 298 U.S. 513, 531 (1936) (“If obligations of states or their political
subdivisions may be subjected to [a federal bankruptcy law], they are no longer free to manage their
own affairs; the will of Congress prevails over them . . . . And really, the sovereignty of the state,
so often declared necessary to the federal system, does not exist.”). After Congress adopted a
slightly modified version of the statute, the Court upheld the power of Congress to enact a municipal
bankruptcy law, holding that such a law did not violate the Tenth Amendment because, in allowing
a municipality to file for bankruptcy protection, the state acts “in aid, and not in derogation of its
sovereign powers.” United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27, 54 (1938).
46. 77 CONG. REC. 5472 (1933) (“[I]n bankruptcy proceedings heretofore the bankrupt was
always compelled to give up all the property which the bankrupt possessed. In this case, the city
gives up nothing at all, and tries to get out of its indebtedness.”). During the same hearing,
Congressman Cannon of Wisconsin read into the record a letter from the chief counsel of the
Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Co., which described the bill as a misnomer because “[i]n the
bankruptcy courts the assets of a bankrupt are turned over to a trustee and disposed of for the benefit
of the creditors.” Id. at 5478.
47. See Harold Gill Reuschlein, Municipal Debt Readjustment: Present Relief and Future
Policy, 23 CORNELL L.Q. 365, 371–72 n. 35 (1938); Max Radin, The Nature of Bankruptcy, 89 U.
PA. L. REV. 1, 9 (1940) (“Whatever purposes bankruptcy attempts to carry out, it does so by working
on the creditors primarily, by compelling them to reorganize their relations to the debtor or to each
other in regard to the debtor’s property.”) (emphasis added). Garrard Glenn posited that a law is
not a bankruptcy law unless there is a controllable debtor. Along those lines, he suggested that
municipal bankruptcy is not bankruptcy because there is no such control, and cites Ashton as
confirmation of this. Control means opening up books and property to the court, primarily with the
goal of exposing the fraudulent debtor. Garrard Glenn, Essentials of Bankruptcy: Prevention of
Fraud and Control of Debtor, 23 VA. L. REV. 373, 375–77 (1937).
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bankruptcy legislation has expanded beyond liquidation, 48 as explained
above, the amount of property available to a debtor’s creditors plays a critical
role in bankruptcy law and policy. Because municipal finance is not propertybased, chapter 9 lacks some, but not all, of the property preservation and
distribution mechanisms that drive private bankruptcy law.
The Code acknowledges the special nature of municipal finance in its
eligibility requirements for chapter 9. Unlike other Code chapters, chapter 9
places strict entry conditions on municipalities that wish to seek bankruptcy
protection. 49 One is that the state in which the municipality is located give
specific authorization to the municipality to file. 50 This reflects both that a
municipality is a creature of the state in which it is located and, as I will
discuss in Part II below, that municipal transactions are strictly defined and
limited by state laws.
The insolvency requirement for eligibility also reflects the lack of a
property basis in municipal finance. Unlike other debtors, a municipality that
wants bankruptcy protection must prove that it is insolvent in order to file. 51
An individual or entity is insolvent when its liabilities exceed its assets. 52 The
definition of insolvency for municipalities is different—a municipality is
insolvent when it is either generally not paying its debts as they become due
or unable to pay such debts. 53 Courts in recent chapter 9 cases have
recognized that although the Code standard is a financial standard, a
municipality’s ability to pay debts as they become due is tied to a status
unique to municipalities—the ability to provide essential government
services going forward. 54 These courts have coined the term “service delivery
insolvency” to describe the inability to provide these services and support a
finding of insolvency as defined in the Code. 55
A chapter 9 filing does not create a bankruptcy estate. The omission of
an estate, 56 combined with explicit prohibitions on judicial interference with
municipal assets and governance, 57 solidify congressional deference to a
state’s power over its cities. These features also reflect the reality of
48. Even a traditional reorganization could be viewed as a liquidation, however. See Jackson,
supra note 27, at 893–94 (suggesting that a chapter 11 reorganization can be viewed as a liquidation
in which the debtor is sold to its creditors).
49. 11 U.S.C. § 109(c).
50. Id. § 109(c)(3); Juliet M. Moringiello, Specific Authorization to File Under Chapter 9:
Lessons from Harrisburg, 32 CAL. BANKR. J. 237, 244–45 (2012).
51. 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(3).
52. Id. § 101(32)(A), (B).
53. Id. § 101(32)(C).
54. See C. Scott Pryor, Who Bears the Burden? The Place for Participation of Municipal
Residents in Chapter 9, 37 CAMPBELL L. REV. 160, 164–66 (2015) (observing that “[t]he concept
of service delivery insolvency . . . is of recent vintage in chapter 9 analysis”).
55. See In re City of Detroit, 504 B.R. 191, 263–64 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013); see also In re
City of Stockton, 493 B.R. 771, 789–90 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2013).
56. See 11 U.S.C. § 901 (omitting § 541 from the Code sections included in chapter 9); see also
id. § 902 (defining “property of the estate” as “property of the debtor” for chapter 9 purposes).
57. 11 U.S.C. §§ 903, 904.

14

BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L.

[Vol. 12

municipal finance law. Creating an estate from which creditors can share in
chapter 9 would expand the non-bankruptcy property rights of creditors,
something that the bankruptcy process does not do.
The lack of creditor control over municipal property is reflected in other
omissions from chapter 9. For example, chapter 9 does not require that a
municipal debtor obtain court approval before disposing of property.58
Moreover, it specifically preserves municipal control over its property.59
Tenth Amendment aside, these omissions are rooted in the public trust nature
of municipal property.
While chapter 9 omits some sections of the Bankruptcy Code that grant
the court control over a municipal debtor’s property, some such sections
remain. For example, chapter 9 not only incorporates the Code’s preferential
and fraudulent transfer provisions, 60 but it also includes, as an alternative
condition to filing, an attempt by a creditor to obtain a preference. 61 The
essence of a preference is that the creditor receiving the preferential transfer
has done something to obtain property from the common pool available to all
creditors within ninety days before the debtor’s bankruptcy filing. 62 If a
municipality has control over its property to the exclusion of its creditors,
then a preferential transfer is impossible. Chapter 9 likewise incorporates the
power to avoid unauthorized post-petition transfers of municipal property. 63
Because chapter 9 does not mandate court approval of post-petition transfers
and protects a municipality’s control over its property from bankruptcy court
interference, 64 such a transfer would never be unauthorized. Yet chapter 9
allows a court to appoint a trustee to exercise the municipality’s power to
avoid preferential and other avoidable transfers if the municipality itself fails
to do so. 65
Confusingly, chapter 9 incorporates two plan confirmation concepts that
are well-known in other types of bankruptcy as property-based distribution
concepts. A court may confirm a chapter 9 plan only if it is in the best
58. Id. § 901 (omitting § 363 from the list of Code sections that apply in chapter 9).
59. Id. § 904 (prohibiting bankruptcy court control over a municipal debtor’s property without

consent).
60. Id. § 901 (including §§ 547 and 548 in the list of Code sections applicable in chapter 9).
61. See id. § 109(c)(5)(D) (if a municipality has met all of the other requirements for filing but
has not either obtained the agreement of creditors holding a majority of impaired claims, negotiated
in good faith with its creditors pre-filing, or demonstrated that such negotiation is impracticable, a
municipality may file for chapter 9 if it reasonably believes that a creditor may attempt to obtain a
transfer that would be avoidable as a preferential transfer under § 547).
62. See id. § 547(b)(5) (including, as a necessary element of a preference, the requirement that
the transfer of the debtor’s property allow the creditor to receive a greater distribution in a chapter
7 case than it would have had the transfer not been made).
63. Id. § 901 (incorporating § 549).
64. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
65. See 11 U.S.C. § 926; see also Richard M. Hynes & Steven D. Walt, Pensions and Property
Rights in Municipal Bankruptcy, 33 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 609, 620–28 (2014) (noting chapter
9’s confusing incorporation of property-based rules and providing a detailed analysis of the facial
contradictions between § 904 and the avoiding powers).
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interests of creditors. 66 “Best interests” is a well-known term in bankruptcy
parlance, and although the Code does not use the term in chapters 11 or 13,
the requirement that a claim holder receive at least as much as it would in a
chapter 7 liquidation is known as the “best interests” test. 67 Chapter 9 uses
the term “best interests” without defining it. 68 Courts applying the test in
chapter 9 find that the best interests test is satisfied if the creditors would
receive more under the plan of adjustment than they would if the case were
dismissed. 69
Creditors sometimes argue that a plan of adjustment can satisfy the best
interests test only if the municipality sells or otherwise monetizes available
assets. This was a key point of contention in Detroit’s bankruptcy case
because of the city’s ownership of the Detroit Institute of Arts. 70
Municipalities do in fact monetize assets to satisfy outstanding debts. 71 Yet,
as Judge Rhodes stressed in the Detroit confirmation opinion, because the
creditors would have had no ability to seize the art or any other city asset to
satisfy their claims, the value of city property was irrelevant to the best
interests analysis. 72
In chapter 9 the best interests standard does not stand alone—it is paired
with the requirement that the plan be feasible. 73 The common understanding
of this pairing is that it provides a floor and a ceiling with the best interests
test requiring only that the creditors receive at least as much as they would
outside of bankruptcy (perhaps nothing) and the feasibility test preventing
the municipality from promising too much. 74 In denying confirmation of a
plan of adjustment, the court in In re Mount Carbon Metropolitan District
acknowledged the difference between chapter 11 feasibility and chapter 9
66. 11 U.S.C. § 943(b)(7).
67. See id. §§ 1129(a)(7), 1325(a)(4); see also TABB, supra note 31, at 1135, 1252 (explaining

the best interest standard in chapters 11 and 13).
68. 11 U.S.C. § 943(b)(7).
69. See, e.g., In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. 147, 213 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2014) (defining the
best interests inquiry as one in which the court must determine “whether the available state law
remedies could result in a greater recovery for the City’s creditors than confirmation of the plan”);
see also In re Mount Carbon Metro. Dist., 242 B.R 18, 34 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1999) (defining the best
interest standard as “requiring that a proposed plan provide a better alternative for creditors than
what they already have”).
70. See, e.g., Brian L. Frye, Art & the “Public Trust” in Municipal Bankruptcy, 93 U. DET.
MERCY L. REV. 627 (2016) (explaining the dispute over the Detroit Institute of Arts in the Detroit
bankruptcy in detail); see also Jacoby, supra note 12, at 107 (explaining that some creditors
questioned whether the “Grand Bargain” that protected the art from creditors and reduced pension
cuts generated enough value for the creditors).
71. For example, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, as part of its state-supervised non-bankruptcy
restructuring, monetized its parking system to satisfy debts. See PENNSYLVANIA DEP’T OF CMTY.
& ECON. DEV., HARRISBURG STRONG PLAN 13–21 (August 26, 2013), http://dced.pa.gov/downlo
ad/harrisburg-strong-plan-pdf/?wpdmdl=57498 [hereinafter HARRISBURG STRONG PLAN].
72. In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. at 218–19.
73. 11 U.S.C. § 943(b)(7).
74. 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 943.03[7] (Alan J. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th
ed.).
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feasibility. The chapter 11 feasibility standard directs a court to confirm a
plan only if the confirmation is “not likely to be followed by the liquidation,
or the need for further financial reorganization, of the debtor . . . .” 75 The
Mount Carbon court viewed this as a purely financial standard and stressed
that because the purpose of chapter 9 is not profit, but the continued provision
of public services, the feasibility standard must reflect that purpose. 76 The
court therefore refused to confirm the proposed plan in the absence of a
showing that the debtor would be able to both pay its plan obligations and
provide future public services.
As is the case in chapter 11, if a class of creditors objects to the plan, the
court can confirm the plan only if it does not discriminate unfairly and is fair
and equitable with respect to each dissenting class. 77 The history of the “fair
and equitable” standard predates corporate reorganization law, having
acquired term of art status in railroad reorganizations. 78 Fair and equitable as
a bankruptcy term of art is rooted in the fundamental property principle that
equity holders are the residual owners of the assets of a business enterprise
and therefore cannot be paid until all creditors are paid in full. 79 This
principle, the absolute priority rule, is irrelevant to municipal insolvency
because a municipality has no residual owners. 80
Although chapter 9 incorporates the fair and equitable standard, it omits
the definition of “fair and equitable” that most clearly does not apply to
municipalities; because there are no ownership interests in a municipality,
the provisions in the chapter 11 “fair and equitable” test that apply to
ownership interests are not imported into chapter 9. 81 Even with that
omission, however, the search for a clear fair and equitable standard in
chapter 9 comes up short. Even the truncated chapter 9 fair and equitable
standard references priorities that are hard to find. If a class of claims objects
to the plan, the court will not confirm the plan unless either each claim in the
dissenting class is paid in full or no junior class of claims receives or retains
anything under the plan. 82 The concept of junior and senior claims is a
priority concept, and priority is related to entitlements in a debtor’s property
upon liquidation of that property. 83

75.
76.
77.
78.

11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(11).
See In re Mount Carbon Metro. Dist., 242 B.R. 18, 33–37 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1999).
See 11 U.S.C. § 901 (incorporating § 1129(b)(A) and (B)).
See TABB, supra note 31, at 1151–56 (explaining the history of the fair and equitable
standard).
79. See Case v. L.A. Lumber Prods., 308 U.S. 106, 113–19 (1939).
80. In re Mount Carbon, 242 B.R. at 37.
81. See 11 U.S.C. § 901 (omitting § 1129 (b)(2)(C)).
82. See id. § 1129(b)(2).
83. See In re Frascella Enters., Inc., 360 B.R. 435, 442 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2007) (in discussing
similarity of claims for classification purposes, the court identified the key question as “whether the
claims in a class have the same or similar legal status in relation to the assets of the debtor”).
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C. BANKRUPTCY LAW IN THE ABSENCE OF PROPERTY
Chapter 9 cram down plans are rare, complicating the search for a fair
and equitable standard applicable to municipal bankruptcies. The Detroit case
illustrates how application of the standard falls apart when there are no
property priorities to use as a baseline. In confirming the plan of adjustment
over the objection of two classes of unsecured creditors—those with contract
claims against the city, and those with statutory, tort, and constitutional
claims against the city—Judge Rhodes noted that, because a municipality has
no shareholders, “the absolute priority rule provides unsecured [chapter 9]
creditors no protection.” 84 After noting how little work an absolute priority
rule does in municipal bankruptcy, he turned his focus to the language of the
Code that states the fair and equitable requirement includes but is not
synonymous with the absolute priority rule, 85 and then proceeded with an
analysis that he described as shaped by the purpose of municipal
bankruptcy. 86
The analysis of the cram down standards in the Detroit confirmation
opinion illustrates why the search for a proper foundation for municipal
bankruptcy law is so important. In the absence of a property basis upon which
to determine whether the plan did not discriminate unfairly against the
dissenting creditor classes and was fair and equitable with respect to those
classes, Judge Rhodes relied upon a “judgment of conscience.” 87 After
explaining that this judgment was informed by the purposes of chapter 9 and
the court’s sense of morality, he then pointed to the privileged position of
pension obligations in the Michigan constitution as a reason why the plan
discrimination in favor of pension creditors was justified. 88 A judgment of
conscience gives no certainty to the markets and to those transacting business
with a city. 89 Notice given by a state constitution, however, does.
The overall design of chapter 9 reflects the difficulty of fashioning a
bankruptcy process for a debtor that has no property available to creditors
exercising collection remedies. There was probably no need, however, for
Judge Rhodes to even mention a judgment of conscience in approving
Detroit’s prioritization choices. As I will explore in the next section,
municipal transactions take place in an environment defined by constitutional
provisions, statutes, and payment promises that are unrelated to property
84. In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. 147, 260 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2014).
85. See id.
86. See id. at 261 (“[T]he Court’s analysis of the fair and equitable requirement must focus on

the purposes of chapter 9. . . . [It] must therefore analyze whether imposing the plan on dissenting
classes of creditors is an appropriate and necessary means to achieve that purpose.”).
87. Id. at 256.
88. Id. at 257.
89. For a criticism of this approach that advocates for an interpretation of the fair and equitable
standard that hews more closely to chapter 11 in order to provide more predictability in chapter 9,
see Andrew B. Dawson, Pensioners, Bondholders, and Unfair Discrimination in Municipal
Bankruptcy, 17 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 1, 5 (2014) [hereinafter Dawson, Pensioners].
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grants. This is consistent with the nature and purposes of a municipality—it
is created by the state to provide the services for which the state is
responsible. 90 In private transactions it makes sense to prioritize creditors
according to their property rights. In public transactions considerations not
based on property concepts dictate payment priorities.
As discussed above, bankruptcy law is designed to create, protect, and
divide a common pool of assets among creditors. These bankruptcy goals do
not apply to municipal entities. Bankruptcy law excludes assets granted to a
creditor by way of a security interest or other lien from that common pool,
thus ensuring the priority of creditors who obtained pre-bankruptcy interests
in a debtor’s property. 91 Public debtors are unique in that their assets are not
available to creditors. Not only does this limit creditor remedies against
municipalities, 92 it deprives the bankruptcy system of its traditional baseline
against which to measure a municipality’s ability to pay creditors. The
security that supports public promises to repay is not security in the form of
access to property, it is security based on trust in various types of promises.
The priority value of these promises is rarely if ever tested because
municipalities seldom default on their obligations. 93
The capital structure of municipalities does not mirror that of private
entities. Not only do municipalities lack shareholders, they do not engage in
secured lending in the same way that private entities do. The Bankruptcy
Code generally respects the decisions made by individuals and business
entities in granting priorities in their assets. The most important claim
dichotomy in private bankruptcy distinguishes secured claims from
unsecured claims. 94
Although property lies at the core of bankruptcy procedure and policy, a
bankruptcy process can operate without reference to property. For example,
an important goal of individual bankruptcy is to provide relief to the honest
but unfortunate debtor. 95 Bankruptcy law routinely provides this relief to
90. See RICHARD BRIFFAULT & LAURIE REYNOLDS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON STATE AND
LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 7 (8th ed. 2016).
91. 11 U.S.C. § 541 (2012) brings all “interests of the debtor in property as of the
commencement of the case” into the bankruptcy estate.
92. See McConnell & Picker, supra note 4, at 429–34 (explaining that municipal assets are
immune from creditor process). Municipal debtors do, however, voluntarily sell or otherwise
monetize assets to satisfy creditor claims. See In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. at 177–79 (explaining
Detroit’s “Grand Bargain” in which several foundations and the state of Michigan contributed
money to transfer Detroit’s valuable art collection to a non-city entity), 194–97 (explaining how
Detroit transferred real estate to satisfy creditor claims); see also HARRISBURG STRONG PLAN,
supra note 71, at 13–21 (explaining how the City of Harrisburg monetized its parking assets outside
of bankruptcy).
93. See generally Pengjie Gao et al., Municipal Borrowing Costs and State Policies for
Distressed Municipalities, J. FIN. ECON. 11 (forthcoming 2017), available at https://www3.nd.edu/
~pgao/papers/muni%20default%2004-20-17.pdf (comprehensive study of municipal bonds issued
between 1999 and 2010, revealing that 0.5% of such bonds experienced a default).
94. See 11 U.S.C. § 506.
95. See Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934).
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debtors with no assets to distribute to creditors. 96 The chapter 7 discharge is
unrelated to how much property is distributed to creditors; so long as an
individual plays by the Code’s rules, that individual can emerge from
bankruptcy free from the burden of her prepetition debts. 97 Another goal of
bankruptcy is to deal with competing claims arising out of multiple defaults
and distribute the consequences of those defaults. 98 Bankruptcy law achieves
this latter goal in bankruptcies large and small through various mechanisms.
In chapter 11 the debtor solicits consent for its proposed plan and in the
absence of consent bankruptcy deals with the problem of holdout creditors
through its cram down procedures. 99 In chapter 7 cases bankruptcy deals with
multiple defaults through its distribution priorities and discharge
provisions. 100
In its original conception, municipal bankruptcy law was designed
primarily to deal with the problem of holdouts. 101 This is a particularly knotty
problem in the absence of a property baseline for negotiation. Chapter 11
deals with dissenting creditors by imposing a best interests test for plan
confirmation that requires that each creditor who votes to reject a plan receive
at least what that creditor would receive in a chapter 7 case, 102 and deals with
dissenting creditor classes by imposing the absolute priority rule explained
above. 103 Both of these mechanisms are based on the property rights that
provide the foundation for a private capital structure. In the next section, I
will discuss some of the concepts that underlie the capital structure of
municipalities and their lending practices in order to search for a set of
guiding principles for chapter 9 plan confirmation that recognizes the absence
of property in municipal finance.

96. See Dalié Jimenez, The Distribution of Assets in Consumer Chapter 7 Cases, 83 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 795, 797 (2009) (finding that 93% of individual chapter 7 debtors had no assets that
could be distributed to unsecured creditors).
97. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 546(a) (explaining effect of discharge), 727(a) (setting forth grounds for
denial of discharge).
98. See Warren, supra note 28, at 777. Whether those consequences should be distributed strictly
according to state law entitlements is a matter of spirited debate. See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird &
Thomas H. Jackson, Corporate Reorganizations and the Treatment of Diverse Ownership Interests:
A Comment on Adequate Protection of Secured Creditors in Bankruptcy, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 97, 103
(1984).
99. See Daniel J. Bussel & Kenneth N. Klee, Recalibrating Consent in Bankruptcy, 83 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 663, 694–98 (2009).
100. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 726, 727.
101. See Omer Kimhi, Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code: A Solution in Search of a Problem, 27
YALE J. ON REG. 351, 362 (2010).
102. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7).
103. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2); see also supra notes 76–79 and accompanying text.
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II. THE LACK OF A PROPERTY FOUNDATION FOR MUNICIPAL
FINANCE LAW
“To employ a seeming paradox, private municipal activities are all of them
public. What has been called private in municipal activity is, nevertheless,
public when contrasted with purely private enterprise and adventure.” 104

The quote above distills the problems inherent in adapting a law written
to address corporate failures to municipal distress into a core issue—
everything that a municipality does is directed in some way by a
governmental entity and affects members of the public. When a municipal
entity borrows money, buys goods, hires employees, or enters into a plethora
of transactions, public policy concerns are relevant. 105 Recognizing this fact
is key to providing some certainty in municipal bankruptcy outcomes. Rather
than drawing analogies to secured debt and relying on judgments of
conscience, courts can judge plans of adjustment based on the expectations
of parties that transact with municipalities. Those expectations are based not
in property rights, but on the web of promises, defined and buttressed by
statutes that support municipal obligations. Although it is famously difficult
to determine relative priorities in the municipal capital structure, 106 thinking
of creditor priorities in terms of the strength of promises, the notice given by
statutes and constitutions, and the purposes of a municipality can give some
guidance in determining the fairness of creditor treatment in a chapter 9 plan
of adjustment.
A. MUNICIPAL PROPERTY: THE PUBLIC TRUST AND BEYOND
Municipalities do not own property in the same way that individuals and
business entities own property. Property theory is based on private
ownership, and property rules protect private entitlements. 107 A municipality
does not hold property for itself as an entity, it holds property for the residents
of the municipality. As a result, public entities cannot lose their property
rights under circumstances that would cause a private party to lose its rights.
One example of how traditional property rules protect the public interest
in municipal land is found in adverse possession law. All states have a statute
104. Wood v. Detroit, 155 N.W. 592, 596 (Mich. 1915).
105. See Janice C. Griffith, Local Government

Contracts: Escaping from the
Governmental/Proprietary Maze, 75 IOWA L. REV. 277, 318 (1990). For example, statutes govern
transactions by public entities and require competitive bidding if the cost of a project exceeds a
certain dollar amount. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 36-1-12 (West 2011) (Indiana public
construction law); see also WASH. REV. CODE § 39.04 (2008) (Washington public works law).
106. The ongoing disputes in resolving Puerto Rico’s debt crisis provide an example of these
difficulties. See, e.g., Mary Williams Walsh, Hedge Fund Sues to Have Puerto Rico’s Bankruptcy
Case Thrown Out, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2017, at B6 (explaining that the bankruptcy-like procedure
to resolve Puerto Rico’s debt problems is “extremely complex” because “the hierarchy of creditors
is unclear”).
107. See JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY 3 (5th ed. 2016) (“We tend to think of property as
an individual entitlement.”).
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of limitations for actions to recover possession of real property. Every law
student learns that if an owner of land does not take action to recover her land
within the statutory period, a trespasser whose actions indicate that he is
using the land productively can receive good title to the land. 108 A different
rule applies to land held by public entities—all states observe the rule that
title to publicly-owned land dedicated to a public purpose cannot be
transferred by adverse possession. 109 Some states, however, finding the
distinction between municipal land held for a public purpose and that held
for a non-public purpose to be artificial, protect all publicly held land from
transfer by adverse possession. 110 In several states, the statutory protection
for all municipal land is explicit. 111 Yet even in some states in which statutes
protect municipal land from adverse possession only if the land is held for a
public purpose, courts have recognized that any municipal ownership of land
is for a public purpose unless the municipality declares its intention to
abandon its plans to develop the land for public use. 112 The special adverse
possession rules protect the public; residents should not use the use of public
assets because of the negligence of public employees. 113
Public assets are similarly protected from the creditor process. Some
point to the public trust doctrine as the basis for this protection, as did the
lawyers for the Detroit Institute of Arts in arguing successfully that the court
could not require sale of the city-owned art to satisfy creditor claims. 114 There
is very little authority on the doctrine as it applies to protection of municipal
assets from creditors; most authority on the public trust doctrine relates to
protecting natural resources such as waterways and other real estate such as
city parks, from private development. 115 Because of the limited scope of this
authority, some have argued that the public trust doctrine has no application
to chattels owned by municipalities. 116 Yet opinions protecting municipal
assets from seizure emphasize that municipalities hold assets “in trust for the
108. See Paula R. Latovick, Adverse Possession Against the States: The Hornbooks Have It
Wrong, 29 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 939, 940 (1996).
109. See generally Paula R. Latovick, Adverse Possession of Municipal Land: It’s Time to Protect
This Valuable Asset, 31 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 475 (1998).
110. See generally id.
111. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 477:34 (2017) (protecting all “public ground” from adverse
possession).
112. See American Trading Real Estate Props., Inc. v. Trumbull, 574 A.2d 796, 802 (Conn. 1990)
(“[P]roperty that is held in fee simple ownership by municipalities must be presumed to be held for
public use.”).
113. See State v. Owen, 41 A.2d 809, 812 (N.J. 1945).
114. Response of the Detroit Institute of Arts to Objections to the City’s Amended Plan of
Confirmation at 19, In re City of Detroit, No. 13-53846 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2014).
115. For a survey of the variations on the public trust doctrine, see Thomas W. Merrill, The Public
Trust Doctrine: Some Jurisprudential Variations and Their Implications, 38 U. HAW. L. REV. 261
(2016).
116. See Frye, supra note 70, at 659–60 (explaining that although the public trust doctrine should
not have protected the art in the Detroit Institute of Arts, the court was correct to recognize that the
city should not be forced to liquidate the art to satisfy creditor claims).
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public,” 117 and that as a result, a municipality has no property that can be
taken by a creditor exercising its remedies. 118 Whether a municipality owns
property in public trust or not, most agree that seizure of public property by
creditors would impair the ability of a public entity to carry out its
obligations. 119
The remedies available against a non-paying municipal entity reinforce
the distance between property concepts and municipal finance. Even an
unsecured creditor of a private actor eventually has recourse against that
entity’s property if any such property is available and unencumbered. 120
These property remedies do not exist against public entities. A municipality’s
primary asset is its taxing power, 121 but such power is not an asset that
creditors can seize. Because public borrowing does not incorporate the
property concepts embedded in private borrowing, the remedies for nonpayment differ. Mandamus is a typical remedy in the public context.122
Although mandamus is available, it is rarely used and somewhat ineffective.
The goal of a mandamus action is to force a public official to apply the first
funds received to pay creditors. Many state courts are unwilling to force a
public official to do so if the result would be to pay a financial market creditor
before a provider of essential services. 123 Ordinary creditors of a public entity
are even worse off. Even when a statute creates a lien against a debtor’s
property, such statute is inoperable against public property. 124
Hard assets of a municipality, whether real estate or chattels, enjoy some
immunity from seizure by creditors. Municipal creditors therefore do not rely
on these hard assets as potential payment sources. They do, however, rely on
municipal revenues. As explained below, municipalities make promises to
their creditors to apply some portion of their revenues to payment of their
debts. The characteristics of municipal revenues are different from those of
revenues of private entities, however. Municipal revenues consist of taxes,
charges for using municipal assets such as sewers, and intergovernmental aid,
all of which have an impact on residents, visitors, and persons employed in a

117. Meriwether v. Garrett, 102 U.S. 472, 513 (1880).
118. South Dakota v. North Carolina, 192 U.S. 286, 318–19 (1904).
119. See Roosevelt Park v. Norton Twp., 47 N.W.2d 605, 606 (Mich. 1951); see also McConnell

& Picker, supra note 4, at 431.
120. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
121. See, e.g., Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. City of Asbury Park, 316 U.S. 502, 509 (1942).
122. See Samuel L. Bray, The System of Equitable Remedies, 63 UCLA L. REV. 530, 542 (2016).
123. See John Patrick Hunt, Taxes and Ability to Pay in Municipal Bankruptcy, 91 WASH. L. REV.
515, 535–37 (2016) (explaining that although a creditor can pursue a writ of mandamus to force a
tax increase, mandamus is an ineffective remedy).
124. See City of Westminster v. Brannan Sand & Gravel Co., 940 P.2d 393, 395 (Colo. 1997)
(holding that a mechanics’ lien does not attach to municipal property, noting that the “rationale for
the common law’s exemption of public property from mechanics’ liens is to preserve essential
public services and functions while protecting those who benefit from public services and
facilities”).
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municipality. 125 The next section explains how this public character of
municipal revenues limits the freedom of a municipality to encumber those
revenues. In the world of private transactions, property and freedom are
intertwined. 126 A private borrower can easily encumber most or all of its
property as security for a loan, subject to few or no legal restrictions, 127 and
if that borrower cannot pay, the borrower itself bears the pain. Because
municipal borrowing imposes costs on all municipal residents, public entities
lack a similar freedom to use and dispose of property.
B. PUBLIC ENTITY BORROWING: THE WHY, THE HOW, AND THE
COMPETING INTERESTS
Municipalities make several different types of promises when they
borrow money, and state laws attempt to enhance those promises in a variety
of ways. In this section, I will discuss traditional promises and protections
and the more recent innovations in municipal finance. I will also discuss
promises unrelated to borrowing, such as pension promises.
1. The Why
The feature that distinguishes municipal finance from other types of
finance is its public purpose. The role of a municipality in providing goods
and services is distinct from that of a private actor. Public entities step in to
provide goods and services when private markets cannot do so. 128 Public
entities are better situated to provide public goods and services than are
private entities. An example is a paved road or a street light system—because
everyone in the geographical area of the improvement will benefit from it, no
private actor has incentive to provide it. 129 Ideally, when a public entity
provides public goods and services, it does so in furtherance of its “cardinal
civic responsibilities” to protect the health, welfare, and safety of its
citizens. 130
The policy statement above pervades, informs, and shapes the statutes
governing municipal debt. Unlike a private enterprise, a municipality is
125. For a discussion of local government revenue sources, see M. David Gelfand, Comparative
Urban Finance: Are the London and Brooklyn Bridges Falling Down?, 55 TUL. L. REV. 651, 676–
90 (1981).
126. See Jedediah Purdy, A Freedom-Promoting Approach to Property: A Renewed Tradition for
Old Debates, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 1237, 1252 (2005) (explaining Adam Smith’s description of
commercial relationships as “those founded on private property, mediated by contract, and bounded
by exit”).
127. Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., A Property Based Theory of Security Interests:
Taking Debtors’ Choices Seriously, 80 VA. L. REV. 2021, 2021–22 (1994) (an article in which the
two reporters for the revision of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code describe debtor freedom
to encumber property as an important Article 9 policy).
128. See ROBERT AMDURSKY ET AL., MUNICIPAL DEBT FINANCE LAW: THEORY AND PRACTICE
§ 1.1.1 (2d ed. 2015).
129. See id.
130. Dep’t of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 342 (2008).
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limited in its ability to increase revenues. A municipality’s ability to increase
its revenues is restricted by its local boundaries. 131 Municipalities pay their
obligations primarily from tax revenues, and because of the effect that tax
rates have on taxpayers, municipal lending takes place in a heavily regulated
environment. State constitutions permit a municipality to incur debt only for
a public purpose. 132 Because a municipality may increase taxes to make bond
payments, it would be considered unjust to make the public at large pay for
a project for which it gains no benefit. 133 Municipalities fund their public
obligations by collecting taxes so states limit the amount of debt that a
municipality may incur in order to insulate future taxpayers from decisions
in which they played no part. 134 Municipal debt receives favorable tax
treatment because of its public purpose. The funded improvements further
the entity’s social obligations, and as a result, municipal bonds are generally
tax-exempt. Because of this exemption, the federal government and states
forgo revenue in furtherance of a social good. 135
The public purpose of municipal debt not only drives limitations on
public debt but also limits the remedies to which municipal creditors can
resort. Creditors of private entities have recourse to the entity’s property in
the event of non-payment. 136 As discussed above, creditors of public entities
do not. 137 Access to property is a key feature in the design of creditors’ rights
laws, but municipal creditors have no rights to their debtors’ assets. This
reality takes property out of the laws governing creditors’ remedies and also
removes it as a bankruptcy distribution baseline.

131. See Richard Briffault, The Local Government Boundary Problem in Metropolitan Areas, 48
STAN. L. REV. 1115, 1129 (1996) (explaining that local governments receive most of their revenue
from taxes rather than from higher levels of government).
132. James A. Coniglio, Borrowing Authority of State and Local Governments: State Debt, in 1
STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT DEBT FINANCING § 1.4 (2d ed.) (database updated Nov. 2016).
133. See AMDURSKY ET AL., supra note 128, at § 3.1.
134. See Lonegan v. State of N.J., 819 A.2d 395, 402–03 (N.J. 2003) (explaining that New Jersey
adopted its debt limitation in 1844 to protect future generations of taxpayers and to rein in
unchecked speculation by the state); see also AMDURSKY ET AL., supra note 128, at § 4.1.1; see also
Stewart E. Sterk & Elizabeth S. Goldman, Controlling Legislative Shortsightedness: The
Effectiveness of Constitutional Debt Limitations, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 1301, 1315–16 (surveying
different types of debt limitations).
135. See Fox v. U.S., 397 F.2d 119, 122 (8th Cir. 1968) (explaining that the federal tax exemption
for public debt reflects “a fundamental long-standing policy of Congress that the federal government
shall not impose any restraint on the borrowing power of the states or their political subdivisions
for public use and benefit”).
136. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-601(a) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010) (allowing a
secured creditor to foreclose on collateral in the event of a debtor default).
137. See, e.g., Meriwether v. Garrett, 102 U.S. 472, 513 (1880); see also Little River Bank &
Trust Co. v. Johnson, 141 So. 141, 143 (Fla. 1932) (defining protected public property as that
property “absolutely essential to the existence of the public corporation, or necessary and useful to
the exercise and performance of governmental powers, or the performance of governmental
duties”); supra notes 114–124 and accompanying text.
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2. Public Borrowing: Promises Not Property
“Debt,” as defined in municipal finance rules, is not debt as commonly
understood in the commercial world. This is an important point to consider—
bankruptcy law is written on a foundation of private contracts; public
contracts use a different language and are subject to a distinct set of rules.
Commercial parties understand debt to mean any obligation to pay. The
municipal finance definition of debt is rooted in the effect of municipal debt
on the public. 138 Debts subject to constitutional or statutory debt restrictions
are those that may result in a tax increase. Other obligations, such as those
payable from specific revenues and those payable from annual budget
appropriations, are not considered “debt” for the purpose of debt limitation
clauses. 139 A commercial lawyer tends to think of all of these obligations in
terms of the property, or lack of property, supporting them. In the absence of
a property grant, all are unsecured. Municipal finance, by contrast,
distinguishes among promises. Some promises are understood to provide
high assurance of payment, like the full faith and credit promise; others
provide less certainty, like the appropriations promise. 140
a. The General Obligation Promise
The markets have long considered general obligation bonds to be failsafe. Municipal finance participants describe general obligation bonds as
being backed by a pledge of the issuer’s full faith and credit, its taxing power,
or both. 141 Both the grant and the promised security are not security as
commonly understood by commercial lawyers. In the commercial world, a
grant of security carries with it a remedy against the property interest pledged.
A full faith and credit pledge, on the other hand, does not grant the recipient
a lien on any municipal property. 142 Instead, the full faith and credit pledge
is couched in the contract language of obligation. According to one court, a
full faith and credit provision “does no more than express an understanding
and appreciation of the legal obligation to pay the bond according to its
terms.” 143 Moreover, this pledge is limited by governing law. Most states
138. See Burgos v. State, 118 A.3d 270, 291 (N.J. 2015) (stating that debt limits exist to “save
the state from itself” and protect future taxpayers from legislative acts).
139. See, e.g., Wilmington Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Bradford, 382 A.2d 1338, 1346–47 (Del. 1978)
(explaining that there is no pledge of state credit without incurring a liability backed by the taxing
power of the state); State Hwy. Comm’r v. Detroit City Controller, 49 N.W.2d 318, 325 (Mich.
1951) (explaining that obligations payable out of specific non-tax revenues are not debt subject to
statutory and constitutional debt limits); see also Shoked, supra note 22, at 1253–54.
140. See Lonegan v. State of N.J., 819 A.2d 395, 406 (N.J. 2003) (acknowledging that the
payment of appropriations debt was “highly likely” if only to protect the state in the bond market).
141. NAT’L ASS’N OF BOND LAW., GENERAL OBLIGATION BONDS: STATE LAW, BANKRUPTCY,
AND DISCLOSURE CONSIDERATIONS (Aug. 2014), http://www.nfma.org/assets/documents/other.o
rgs/nabl.gobonds.8.14.pdf [hereinafter GENERAL OBLIGATION BONDS].
142. See State ex rel. Babson v. Sebring, 155 So. 669, 672 (Fla. 1934).
143. See id. The bonds in the cited case pledged the city’s full faith, credit and resources. Even
the pledge of resources did not create a lien on the municipality’s property.
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place a cap on the amount of debt that their municipalities can incur, often
expressed as a percentage of the value of that municipality’s taxable real
estate. An issuer cannot be forced to raise taxes above these statutory
limits. 144 In the municipal finance world, the pledge of full faith and credit
and/or taxing power is a promise that can be enforced only by a mandamus
action.
General obligation bonds embody contract promises. As such, they are
protected by the Contracts Clause of the Constitution. 145 Courts have made
clear the difference between a full faith and credit pledge and a mortgage
granted by an individual or business, affirming that a full faith and credit
pledge conveys no property interest. 146
The concept of a general obligation bond is not a monolithic one.
Variations include the unlimited tax general obligation (UTGO) bond, the
limited tax general obligation bond (LTGO), and the general fund general
obligation bond (GFGO). The nature and effect of these designations vary
from state to state, but unlike general obligation bonds payable from an
issuer’s general fund, UTGO and LTGO bonds are backed by a promise to
levy taxes. 147 In the Detroit bankruptcy, bondholders and the city fought over
whether the UTGO and LTGO obligations were “secured,” 148 mapping
commercial lending terms onto public finance instruments whose safety is
not based on a property grant but rather on the types and amounts of taxes
that can be used to pay the obligation.
b. Revenue Bonds Distinguished
Reading chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code, one would think that there
are only two types of municipal debt: special revenue debt and other. This
binary distinction mirrors the secured/unsecured distinction in other types of
bankruptcy. Although on the one hand, this distinction is not the crucial one
in municipal financing, the fairly detailed (in chapter 9 terms) treatment of
special revenue bonds emerged from a concern that the Bankruptcy Code did
not take the realities of municipal finance into account. The Code treats
revenue bonds as secured debt, and when Congress revised the Bankruptcy
Code in 1988, it took the needs of the municipal market into account in
protecting the security interest created by revenue bonds. The Senate
Judiciary Committee report specifically notes the difficulties and bad results
144. Shoked, supra note 22, at 1253.
145. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
146. See State ex rel. Dos Amigos v. Lehman, 131 So. 533, 538 (Fla. 1930). Courts in other states

have reinforced the principle that a faith and credit pledge creates a contractual pledge unsupported
by any property interest. See Flushing Nat’l Bank v. Mun. Assistance Corp., 358 N.E.2d 848 (N.Y.
1976) (holding that the state’s Emergency Moratorium Act, which suspended the right of certain
bondholders to enforce their debts, violated the New York Constitution).
147. GENERAL OBLIGATION BONDS, supra note 141, at 4.
148. See In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. 147, 187–90 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2014) (explaining
creditor’s argument that the UTGO bonds were special revenue bonds).
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“created by the incorporation of general commercial finance concepts into
the municipal bankruptcy provisions.” 149 A security interest in special
revenues extends to such revenues generated after the commencement of the
bankruptcy case. 150 This rule is contrary to the rule that applies in all other
types of bankruptcies—the floating lien does not float, and property received
by the debtor post-petition is free from pre-petition liens. 151 This reflects the
realities of municipal finance practice: holders of special revenue bonds look
to only one source of payment. That source is the revenue stream generated
by the project financed. The bondholders have no recourse whatsoever
against the municipal entity if the funds turn out to be insufficient. Congress
also protected special revenue obligations from the automatic stay and made
clear that bankruptcy law could not transform a special revenue obligation
into a general obligation of the municipality. 152
Special revenue bonds are secured in the way that commercial lawyers
understand the term “secured debt.” The commercial definition of secured
debt assumes that there is a defined property interest that is pledged to a
creditor to secure the payment of an obligation. 153 The definition of security
interest includes the sale of accounts receivable, which is probably the best
analogy to a special revenue pledge. 154 Just as in a sale of accounts, the
security pledge in a special revenue bond is non-recourse. When a loan to a
municipality is secured by a special revenue pledge, the municipality
commits to pay all the revenues generated by a specific project in excess of
amounts needed to operate the project. If the municipality fails to remit the
revenues to the bondholders, the bondholders have remedies with respect to
those revenues. 155
In its pure form, the revenue bond does not put a municipality’s taxpayers
at risk because payment is made solely from revenues generated from a
specific project. For this reason, revenue bonds are exempt from
constitutional debt limits. 156 This is a key point to keep in mind as parties
argue over whether various types of general obligation bonds should be
treated as secured by a tax pledge. Revenue bonds are protected as secured
precisely because their risk is directly related to the financed project. Even

149.
150.
151.
152.

S. REP. NO. 100-506, at 4 (1988).
See 11 U.S.C. § 928 (2012).
See id. § 552(a).
See id. §§ 922 (excepting the application of pledged special revenues from the operation of
the automatic stay), 927 (denying the holders of special revenue obligations the ability to be treated
as holders of recourse obligations under § 1111(b) of the Code).
153. U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(35) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010) (defining security
interest as “[a]n interest in personal property or fixtures which secures payment or performance of
an obligation”).
154. Id.
155. Kevin A. Kordana, Tax Increases in Municipal Bankruptcies, 83 VA. L. REV. 1035, 1049–
50 (1997).
156. AMDURSKY ET AL., supra note 128, at § 1.3.
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revenue bonds are secured only by a stream of income from a project, not by
the physical project itself.
3. Beyond General Obligation and Revenue Bonds
A comparison of general obligation and revenue bonds illustrates how
market expectations in the municipal context are sometimes the reverse of
those in the commercial context. Market participants consider general
obligation bonds to be safe because there are numerous payment sources
available for their repayment. 157 Revenue bonds are considered less safe
because they are payable out of a distinct set of funds. Yet revenue bonds are
secured by a property right in the form of a dedicated source of funds. They
are non-recourse, however, so unsatisfied creditors may not proceed against
other funds of the municipality. Increasingly, or most notably in the recent
distress cases of Detroit and Harrisburg, local governments have been
engaging in the sorts of practices that marked the subprime lending crisis.
Just as homeowners could buy a previously unaffordable house by deferring
the obligation to pay as long as possible, municipalities engaged in a number
of lending practices that deferred the obligation to pay as long as possible.
One example of a debt obligation that provides no new value to the
municipality is the “scoop and toss” refunding. Such refunding allows an
issuing municipality to defer imminent debt service and add it to the back end
of the debt service schedule. Municipalities in distress tend to engage in a
series of such refunding, resulting in a very large debt over time. 158 Other
financing arrangements that may ultimately harm municipalities include
swaptions and capital appreciation bonds. 159 Moreover, sometimes
municipalities find creative ways to avoid clear statutory restrictions on their
transactions. 160
4. The Competing Interests
Priorities matter only when a municipality falls into distress. It is only at
that point when we see questions about whether a bondholder will be paid
157. Id. at § 1.3.3.
158. See David Unkovic, Municipal Financial Distress: Causes and Solutions 8, presented at The

Bond Buyer’s Second Symposium on Distressed Municipalities, March 2013 (explaining how the
debts of a Pennsylvania school district increased exponentially through the use of exotic financial
instruments).
159. For an explanation of a variety of potentially abusive financing arrangements, see Tom
Sgouros, Predatory Public Finance, 17 J.L. SOC’Y 91 (2015).
160. The forensic audit conducted of the City of Harrisburg’s finances during its state-supervised
recovery provides some examples. A notable one relates to the contract to retrofit the trash-to-energy
incinerator whose debt was guaranteed by the city. The city awarded the contract without a
competitive bidding process and failed to require a performance bond from the contractor, relying
instead on “alternative security.” See DOUGLAS F. SCHLEICHER ET AL., THE HARRISBURG
AUTHORITY RESOURCE RECOVERY FACILITY FORENSIC INVESTIGATION REP. 22–25, 66–67 (Jan.
12, 2012), http://harrisburgcitycontroller.com/wp-content/uploads/Harrisburg-Report.pdf.

2017] Shaky Property Foundations of Municipal Bankruptcy Law

29

before firefighters or police. Local governments exist for several reasons:
they provide services, they hold land in the public interest, and they regulate
for public health, safety, and welfare. 161 The obligations of local governments
are labor-intensive, therefore they will have large obligations for salaries,
pensions, and health benefits. Like general obligation bonds, all of these
service claims on municipal resources are unsecured in the commercial or
property sense.
A significant creditor class in chapter 9 bankruptcies is made up of
individuals holding pension claims. Like the claims of general obligation
bondholders, these claims are not supported by any property, and should, to
a commercial lawyer, be viewed as unsecured claims. 162 Yet, as is the case
with bond obligations, most states make special provisions for these
obligations either in their statutes or in their constitutions. The constitutions
of several states provide that pension benefits “shall not be impaired.” 163 To
further enhance the security of pension benefits, state laws contain pension
funding mandates. 164
Another common creditor class in the larger general-purpose
municipality bankruptcies is the class of individuals holding civil rights
claims. Numerous laws aimed at protecting vulnerable individuals bind
cities. 165 Yet because municipal obligations to persons harmed by municipal
actors are not backed by any property, courts tend to view these as low-level
claims undeserving of any special priority. 166

161. See Comm’rs of Albany Cty. v. Laramie Cty., 92 U.S. 307, 308 (1875) (“Counties, cities
and towns . . . are usually invested with certain subordinate legislative powers . . . to promote the
general welfare of the municipality.”); see also Michelle Wilde Anderson, The New Minimal Cities,
123 YALE L.J. 1118, 1158 (2014).
162. See Jack M. Beermann, Solving the Public Pension “Crisis,” 41 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 999,
1002–04 (2014) (explaining how the Central Falls, Rhode Island chapter 9 plan of adjustment
favored bondholders over pension creditors and acknowledging that both groups of creditors were
unsecured).
163. See Darryl B. Simko, Of Public Pensions, State Constitutional Contract Protection, and
Fiscal Constraint, 69 TEMP. L. REV. 1059 (1996) (explaining the constitutional protections in
several states).
164. Such mandates often prove unenforceable and the failure to comply has led to drastically
underfunded pensions throughout the United States. For a discussion of these mandates and the
woeful state of pension funding despite these mandates, see generally Amy B. Monahan, State
Fiscal Constitutions and the Law and Politics of Public Pensions, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 117 (2015).
165. For an overview, see Melissa B. Jacoby & Mary Ellen Goode, Who Pays for Police
Misconduct in Bankrupt Cities?, (UNC Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2796582, 2017),
available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2796582.
166. See In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. 147, 258–59 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2014) (confirming
chapter 9 plan over the objection of the class of civil rights claimholders, explaining that there is no
“mission-related justification” for the city to discriminate in their favor); see also Silver Sage
Partners, Ltd., v. City of Desert Hot Springs, 339 F.3d 782, 791–92 (9th Cir. 2003) (addressing the
intersection of the Federal Fair Housing Act and chapter 9 bankruptcy and concluding that “there is
no evidence that Congress felt that the objectives of the former were more important than the
latter”).
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In the next section of this Article, I discuss bankruptcy policies to
illustrate how Congress assigned priorities in the Bankruptcy Code. This
discussion will lay the foundation for a discussion of the policies that can
inform the assignment of priority treatment in any federal procedure for
municipal debt resolution.
III. BANKRUPTCY POLICIES AND PRIORITIES
Creditors of individuals and private entities have a number of methods
by which they can ensure that their claims are paid before others outside of
bankruptcy. The first is to ensure that the debtor’s assets are partitioned in
such a way that no other creditors can have a plausible claim to them. 167
Another is to obtain a property interest in the debtor’s assets. Last is to be a
beneficiary of a statutory or constitutional priority. This last category
includes statutes that grant property interests in the debtor’s assets, such as
mechanics’ lien statutes. The Bankruptcy Code respects the first two
methods, and although it recognizes statutory liens, it allows the trustee to set
aside certain statutory liens as contrary to bankruptcy policy. 168
Bankruptcy law’s distinctions amongst creditors are rooted in the nonbankruptcy borrowing and lending practices of individuals and business
entities. In the private realm, bankruptcy respects the choice to partition
property in such a way as to elevate one creditor over another, but does not
provide the same protection to contractual promises that do not include the
grant of a property interest. 169
Although bankruptcy rules are based on property concepts, in a large
percentage of individual bankruptcies there is no property to distribute. Even
in those bankruptcies, there is a notion of “worthier” promises that is
embodied in the Bankruptcy Code through the statutory priorities and the
rules on non-dischargeability. 170 As a result, bankruptcy priority rules reflect
the realities of finance and incorporate distinct bankruptcy policies and
values.
Bankruptcy rules reflect several core goals and values. The Code’s rules
promote an orderly and collective debt relief proceeding that provides
predictability to markets and transacting parties. The stay of collection
proceedings that arises immediately upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition
167. David Skeel has explored the various types of liens and lien substitutes. See Skeel, supra
note 19, at 680.
168. Even state laws that grant liens to creditors can be disregarded in bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 545 (2012) (allowing the trustee to set aside landlord’s liens and statutory liens that arise upon
bankruptcy).
169. For example, a debtor may give a “negative pledge” promise to a creditor, whereby it
promises not to grant security interests in its property to other lenders. Although this is a binding
contractual obligation, the law does not consider it to be the same as a security interest in the debtor’s
property. See Carl S. Bjerre, Secured Transactions Inside Out: Negative Pledge Covenants,
Property, and Perfection, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 305, 306–07 (1999).
170. 11 U.S.C. §§ 507, 523.
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promotes orderliness. 171 The migration of causes of action to one forum, the
Bankruptcy Court, as well as rules ensuring the equal treatment of similarly
situated creditors promotes the collective nature of the proceeding. 172 The
Bankruptcy Code promotes predictability by setting forth clear priorities. 173
Bankruptcy’s predictability also springs from its uniformity, but the
constitutional uniformity mandate requires only that debtors within each state
be treated uniformly, not that debtors nationwide be treated in a uniform
manner. 174 Bankruptcy provides debt relief through discharge, and solves the
holdout problem through its cram down provisions. 175 All of these goals can
be accomplished without reference to property rights.
A. FIRST-LEVEL (PROPERTY-BASED) PRIORITIES: SECURED AND
UNSECURED CLAIMS
In private bankruptcies, the Code respects private finance practices in
granting the first level of priority to security interests. Commercial law rules
tend to turn on whether a party has property rights in an asset. They also tend
to differentiate between property and contract rights, without acknowledging
the blurred line between the two. 176 The only way that a creditor can ensure
itself of full payment in bankruptcy absent a Code priority is by obtaining a
security interest in some of the debtor’s assets. 177 This security interest can
either be a consensual one created by contract or one granted by statute. 178
One reason that the Code respects security interests is the Fifth Amendment
to the Constitution, which prohibits the taking of private property without
just compensation. 179
171. See id. § 362.
172. See id. §§ 726(b) (mandating pro rata sharing), 1122 (allowing a chapter 11 debtor to place

claims in the same class only if the claims are substantially similar).
173. See id. § 507.
174. See id. § 522(b)(2) (recognizing that a state may require that individual debtors take
advantage of state property exemptions rather than federal property exemptions); see also Hanover
Nat’l Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181, 190 (1902) (The bankruptcy system is uniform in the
constitutional sense when “the trustee takes in each State whatever would have been available to
the creditors had the bankrupt law not been passed.”).
175. 11 U.S.C. §§ 524, 1129.
176. Several authors have explored the edges of this distinction. See, e.g., Bjerre, supra note 169;
see also Peter Coogan et al., The Outer Fringes of Article 9: Subordination Agreements, Security
Interests in Money and Deposits, Negative Pledge Clauses, and Participation Agreements, 79
HARV. L. REV. 229 (1965).
177. See Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274, 286 (1985) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
178. See id.
179. U.S. CONST. amend. V. There has been robust debate, however, about both the Fifth
Amendment foundations of the primacy of secured credit in bankruptcy and its desirability from a
business perspective. See, e.g., Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Measuring the Social Costs
and Benefits and Identifying the Victims of Subordinating Security Interests in Bankruptcy, 82
CORNELL L. REV. 1349 (1997) (suggesting that the costs of subordinating security interests in
bankruptcy would impose unacceptable costs and burdens on commercial transactions); see also
Lawrence L. Ponoroff & F. Stephen Knippenberg, The Immovable Object Versus the Irresistible
Force: Rethinking the Relationship between Secured Credit and Bankruptcy Policy, 95 MICH. L.
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On the first level, commercial law recognizes secured and unsecured
debt, and nothing in the middle. 180 Those who have explored negative
pledges in depth decry the bipolar distinction between secured and unsecured
creditors, claiming that there are several status positions between the two
poles. 181 The negative pledge calls up the distinction between property and
contract, and thus the priority questions, that are raised by various promises
in municipal bonds.
The Code singles out security interests for protection both because of
Fifth Amendment concerns and respect for commercial practices.
Bankruptcy law has not always rejected state law non-property priorities.
Until the Chandler Act in 1938, federal bankruptcy law incorporated nonproperty priorities provided for by state law. 182 Fearing that honoring such
priorities would leave little or nothing for a debtor’s unsecured creditors, the
Chandler Act shifted the state priority focus to liens. 183 As a result, today’s
bankruptcy law honors state property priorities but not other state-created
priorities. Yet liens play no role in municipal finance, except for in revenue
bond financing. Although some states have passed laws granting general
obligation bondholders a lien on taxes, 184 liens, and lien analogies, may not
be a useful tool in determining municipal priorities.
Although holders of secured claims have top priority in a debtor’s assets,
they are not the only favored parties in bankruptcy. Statutory priorities ensure
payment to certain favored creditors in reorganizations, and nondischargeability provides some protection to others in the absence of
property.
B. SECOND-LEVEL PRIORITIES AMONG UNSECURED CREDITORS:
THE WORTHY
1. Priorities as an Expression of Worthiness
Property priorities are the only state law priorities incorporated in the
Code. In individual and business entity cases, the Code grants non-property
priorities to certain unsecured creditors based on various notions of creditor

REV. 2234, 2236 (1997) (acknowledging the tension between state law under Article 9 of the
Uniform Commercial Code, which permits a debtor to fence off all of its property, and the
rehabilitative policies of the Bankruptcy Code); see also Elizabeth Warren, Making Policy with
Imperfect Information: The Article 9 Full Priority Debates, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1373, 1375 (1997)
(questioning why the law would permit two parties, by contract, to bargain away rights of a party
not at the bargaining table).
180. See Bjerre, supra note 169, at 313.
181. Id.
182. See Hynes & Walt, supra note 65, at 645 (explaining that the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 before
the Chandler Act amendments included a fifth priority to “persons entitled to priority by state or
federal non-bankruptcy law”).
183. See Skeel, supra note 19, at 682.
184. See id.
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worthiness. If an insolvent debtor, by definition, 185 does not have sufficient
assets to pay the claims against it in full, then some of its creditors will not
receive full payment of the claims against them. As a result, the Code
provides that specified creditor claims must be either paid before all others
(in the case of a chapter 7 liquidation), 186 or paid in full in order for a plan to
be confirmed (in the case of repayment/reorganization bankruptcies). 187
These “worthy” claims include those of employees, ex-spouses for alimony
and support, and governments for taxes. 188
Where unsecured creditors are concerned, the only categorical priorities
permitted are the ones set forth in the Bankruptcy Code. In the Code chapters
governing private bankruptcies, which incorporate priorities, courts may not
fashion their own using equitable principles. 189 Chapter 9 contains only one
priority, however, that for administrative claims. 190 The reasons for omitting
the other priorities are unclear but may arise from Tenth Amendment
concerns. 191 The absence of priorities in chapter 9 may give courts the
flexibility to fashion priorities based on the statutory protections given to
some types of municipal obligations by state and federal law.
2. Non-Dischargeability as an Expression of Worthiness
The Code also incorporates the idea of worthier promises through its
rules on dischargeability. The goal of all (non-municipal) bankruptcies is to
discharge all pre-bankruptcy debt, but the Code excepts some debts incurred
by individuals from discharge either because the debt arose out of bad debtor
behavior or because the creditor is particularly deferring of repayment. 192
Some examples from individual bankruptcy include student loan debt and
debts for domestic obligations. 193 The dischargeability rules demonstrate the
policy that some debts should simply not be avoided through the use of the
bankruptcy process.

185. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(32) (2012) (defining insolvency for all debtors other than a municipality
and a partnership as a “financial condition such that the sum of such entity’s debts is greater than
all such entity’s property”).
186. Id. § 726(a).
187. See id. §§ 1129(a)(9), 1322(a)(2).
188. Id. § 507(a).
189. See generally United States. v. Noland, 517 U.S. 535 (1996).
190. 11 U.S.C. § 943(b)(5).
191. See Dawson, Pensioners, supra note 89, at 7–9 (cataloguing a number of possible reasons
for the omission of priorities from chapter 9).
192. Margaret Howard, A Theory of Discharge in Consumer Bankruptcy, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 1047,
1056–58 (1987).
193. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5).
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C. RARELY-USED NON-PRIORITIES: THE UNWORTHY
The Bankruptcy Code reserves a place for the unworthy creditor by the
vehicle of equitable subordination. 194 Equitable subordination is a close
relative of equitable reclassification, in which a capital contribution by an
insider designed as a loan is re-cast as an equity investment. 195 The effect of
such a reclassification is to subordinate the insider to creditors.
Equitable subordination is rarely used, and when it is, it remains twinned
with equitable reclassification in the sense that courts are reluctant to use the
tool to subordinate outside creditors. 196 Yet this too could be a useful tool in
municipal bankruptcy cases, particularly when city actors fail to comply with
laws in such a way that their actions harm taxpayers.
IV. APPLYING BANKRUPTCY RULES TO MUNICIPAL ENTITIES
IN THE ABSENCE OF PROPERTY RIGHTS
A. THE ROLES OF FEDERAL AND STATE LAW IN PROVIDING A
FOUNDATION FOR BANKRUPTCY DISTRIBUTION
Some of the goals of municipal bankruptcy are identical to those of
individual and corporate bankruptcy. Any municipal insolvency regime
should provide predictability and certainty, establish a binding collective
proceeding, eliminate debt overhang, and solve the problem of holdout
creditors. Federal law provides the procedure to carry out these goals.
State law, however, provides the substantive foundation on which the
process to achieve these goals operates. State property rules pervade private
bankruptcy; although federal law determines whether a debtor’s rights in
property enter the bankruptcy estate, the rights themselves are defined by
state law. 197 Congress’ constitutional authority to enact “uniform Laws on
the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States” 198 is also
constrained by state choices. Long ago, the Supreme Court ruled that
bankruptcy uniformity means uniformity within a state. 199 In the private
realm, this insures that the bankruptcy process will, at the moment a debtor
194. See id. § 510(a).
195. See Lawrence Ponoroff, Whither Recharacterization, 68 RUTGERS L. REV. 1217, 1228–31

(2016) (explaining the history of recharacterization).
196. I explore the use of equitable subordination in more detail in Juliet M. Moringiello,
Mortgage Modification, Equitable Subordination, and the Honest But Unfortunate Creditor, 79
FORDHAM L. REV. 1599 (2011), in which I advocate for its use to punish subprime mortgage
lenders.
197. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a); Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 54 (1979); see generally Juliet M.
Moringiello, When Does Some Federal Interest Require a Different Result: An Essay on the Use
and Misuse of Butner v. United States, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 657 [hereinafter, Moringiello, Federal
Interest].
198. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 4; see also Gillette & Skeel, supra note 13, at 1210 (explaining
that Congress enacted chapter 9 under the Bankruptcy Clause).
199. See Stellwagen v. Clum, 245 U.S. 605, 613 (1917).
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enters bankruptcy, respect the choices that states make with regard to
property rights. Bankruptcy law can modify those rights, but the question of
whether those rights exist at all is a matter of state law. 200
The state plays a large role in municipal bankruptcy. The state has the
first say on whether and how a municipality can file for bankruptcy, 201 and it
also has the only say as to whether a municipal government will receive any
oversight in the chapter 9 process. 202 In another Article, I questioned whether
bankruptcy courts should defer to state choices regarding the treatment of
municipal creditors. 203 The bankruptcy system should incorporate state
choices insofar as they govern how a municipality can borrow money. If a
statute or constitutional provision sends a signal to third parties that the
recipient of the payment promise is more likely to receive full payment than
other promises, courts in chapter 9 should respect that signal in much the
same way as they respect the signal sent by a perfected security interest. In
the next section, I illustrate how Judge Rhodes incorporated some of those
signals in approving the Detroit plan of adjustment.
B. PRIORITIES IN THE ABSENCE OF PROPERTY: DETROIT AS AN
EXAMPLE
It is easy to administer a priority system based on property rights.
Because property rights generally must be publicized in order to carry with
them priority rights, it is fairly simple to determine who has the prior right to
a debtor’s property. 204 Filing in a public place is not the only way to give
notice of a property right; the Code likewise honors liens created by statute
and by judicial processes that require a public official to seize an asset in
order to fix a judgment creditor’s rights in the asset. 205 One benefit of
recognizing primarily property-based priorities is the notice function that
property plays. Throughout the law of property, a holder of rights can be
certain that those rights will be good against the entire world only if there is
some notice of them. Bankruptcy law recognizes these notice rules; a holder
of an unperfected security interest will likely end up unsecured in
bankruptcy. 206
In the municipal world, however, property rights and priority rights are
uncoupled. No creditors have a right to municipal property to satisfy their

200.
201.
202.
203.

See generally Moringiello, Federal Interest, supra note 197 at 659.
See 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(1).
See supra notes 6–9 and accompanying text.
See generally Juliet M. Moringiello, Chapter 9 Confirmation Standards and the Role of State
Choices, 37 CAMPBELL L. REV. 71 (2015).
204. See U.C.C. §§ 9-317, 322 (AM. LAW. INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010) (granting priority
to perfected security interests), 9-501 (requiring filing in a public office).
205. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(36) (defining judgment lien), (37) (defining lien), (53) defining
statutory lien), 506(a) (recognizing the secured status of lienholders).
206. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 545.
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claims. 207 Both bankruptcy and state law provide methods for fixing creditor
priorities in the absence of property rights. The Detroit confirmation opinion
is replete with references to statutory signals that gave some creditors a
greater expectation of payment than others. Although Judge Rhodes stated
that determining whether the plan of adjustment discriminated unfairly
against certain classes of creditors involved a judgment of conscience, he in
fact relied on signals provided by Michigan statutory law to justify higher
payments to some creditor classes. For example, he pointed to the pension
protections in the Michigan constitution to justify higher payments to pension
creditors, noting that the Michigan constitution gave notice to all creditors
that pension obligations were entitled to special treatment. 208
Judge Rhodes relied on similar signals in approving the favorable
treatment of the UTGO and LTGO bondholders. The UTGO creditors and
the city argued over whether the UTGO claims were secured by tax revenues.
A Michigan statute required voter approval for the additional taxes levied to
pay the bond debt and also required that the city keep the proceeds of those
taxes in a segregated account. 209 Whether this requirement created a statutory
lien is perhaps irrelevant; the statute sends a message to the creditor
community that the UTGO bondholders had a greater chance of repayment.
The LTGO creditors argued that a statute requiring the city to set aside
sufficient tax revenues to make payments on the bonds as a “first budget
obligation” gave them priority over the holders of other unsecured claims. 210
Although Judge Rhodes recognized that the relative priorities granted to the
UTGO and LTGO bondholders by statute was unclear, he deferred to the
city’s view that the statutes gave the UTGO bondholders a “more robust”
claim to full payment than the LTGO bondholders. 211
Notice in municipal finance is not as clear as the notice given by the laws
governing security interests in real and personal property. It is possible,
however, to allocate priorities based on the requirements placed on a bond
issuer by statute. To do so, it is necessary to consider the effect of statutory
payment provisions both on the issuer, in terms of whether the payment
provisions make an issuer more likely to set aside funds for payment, and on
the public generally to determine how statutory language affects the price of
bond obligations. For example, Professor Amy Monahan has analyzed
whether constitutional pension funding requirements have led to better
pension funding. 212 This kind of research with respect to statutory and
207. Municipal entities often monetize assets to satisfy claims. Some thus question whether the
idea of “best interests” in the municipal context should include the requirement that a municipal
debtor monetize some assets.
208. See In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. 147, 256–57 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2014).
209. Id. at 189.
210. Id. at 191.
211. Id. at 191–92.
212. Professor Monahan’s conclusions regarding whether constitutional funding requirements
lead to fiscal discipline were mixed, in part because some states imposed such funding requirements
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constitutional protections of a variety of municipal obligations would be
helpful in guiding courts in fashioning chapter 9 priorities based on statutory
signals.
Subordination of harmful debt is virtually unused in the commercial
world. If otherwise, it might have been a tool used by bankruptcy courts in
the 2008 mortgage fueled financial crisis. 213 Perhaps such a tool should be
revived in the municipal insolvency context when cities take on debt in
violation of governing laws.
Because property rights do not play the same role in municipal finance
as they do in private finance, the rules for determining priorities in chapter 9
should be tailored to take into account municipal finance practices. These
practices are embodied in statutes that limit the types and amount of debt that
municipal entities can incur and that purport to strengthen the payment
promises made. Bankruptcy law permits such reliance on statutory signals;
indeed, it incorporates them in private bankruptcies.
CONCLUSION
Several significant municipal bankruptcies over the past ten years have
given policymakers the opportunity to think about what a municipal
bankruptcy regime should look like. The web of statutes governing municipal
transactions gives notice to parties dealing with cities that some types of debts
are privileged. Although this notice is not nearly as clear as notice given by
recording systems and indeed seems contradictory, it provides some basis for
clarifying priorities in municipal bankruptcy cases. Just as private financing
practices provide the basis for value allocation in individual and entity
bankruptcy, municipal financing practices, which rest on a shaky or nonexistent property foundation, should guide decision-makers in fashioning
chapter 9 rules.

fairly recently in response to funding problems. See Amy B. Monahan, State Fiscal Constitutions
and the Law and Politics of Public Pensions, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 117, 134–39 (2015).
213. See supra notes 208–210 and accompanying text.

